Fifteenmile Creek Wild Steelhead Sanctuary Opened to Kill Fishery

The Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission voted to adopt a staff proposal to open the Fifteenmile Creek Sanctuary where it joins the Columbia River for tribal fishing.  The vote of the commission was 4-1 with Mike Findley voting no. All of the other commission members expressed their dislike for being forced to vote yes, but they did it anyway. The following is testimony of the Native Fish Society in opposition to permanently opening the sanctuary to a kill fishery. 

12-05-2012

To:         ODFW Commission

FR:         Bill Bakke, Native Fish Society

RE:         Fifteenmile Creek Sanctuary Steelhead Harvest

The Native Fish Society does not support fishing in designated sanctuary waters in the Columbia River, for such fisheries are inconsistent with the purpose of these sanctuaries, the Native Fish Conservation Policy,  the Endangered Species Act, and common sense for it is not logical or ethical.

Fifteenmile Creek wild steelhead are threatened with extinction and protected by the federal Endangered Species Act.  Fisheries subtract spawners from the spawning escapement.  Wild steelhead returning to Fifteenmile Creek are already harvested by tribal fisheries in open areas for fishing in the Columbia River and even though they must be released by the sport fishery there is an associated kill that increases with water temperature.  The Columbia River during the summer months approaches lethal temperatures for salmon and steelhead and the pool behind Bonneville Dam has numerous thermal refuges to migrating adult steelhead, providing relief from high water temperatures.  Conservation of wild, ESA-listed steelhead is enhanced by having thermal refuges where fish can escape harvest. 

Since the late 1970s the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife has worked with landowners in the Fifteenmile Creek watershed to restore and protect fish and wildlife habitat.  The landowners in this watershed have a record of cooperation with the state, resulting in important recovery of fish habitat in this basin.  With the contribution of millions of public dollars through state and federal agencies, Fifteenmile Creek has become a model watershed for the state.  How will those who have made investments of funds and land to protect and restore wild steelhead in this stream react to a kill fishery in the Fifteenmile Creek Sanctuary?

The wild steelhead run is listed because it is in jeopardy of extinction.  The conditions in the watershed that contributed to their decline are being addressed and have been for several decades.  The wild steelhead run is tiny.  The minimum number of steelhead needed for a viable population is 500.  But, as the ODFW staff has stated, the adult run falls short of that minimum number for a viable population.  The minimum number of spawners is not the goal; it is what is needed for the wild run to be viable.  The population is stronger with more spawners.  More spawners are needed. 

The consequence of a kill fishery in the Fifteenmile Creek Sanctuary is that fewer, not more, spawners will enter the creek. 

Allowing a fishery in the Fifteenmile Creek Sanctuary is not consistent with the Native Fish Conservation Policy developed by a public advisory group over two years and adopted by the Fish and Wildlife Commission.  “The purpose of this policy is to ensure the conservation and recovery of native fish in Oregon.” (OAR 635-007-0502) 

The first goal of the policy is to “Prevent the serious depletion of any native fish species by protecting natural ecological communities, conserving genetic resources, managing consumptive and non-consumptive fisheries, and using hatcheries responsibly so that naturally produced native fish are sustainable.”  (OAR 635-007-0503 (1))

In order for the Department to make commitments to native fish conservation the Oregon Department of Justice was asked for its opinion regarding the Department’s authority to protect native species.  The ODOJ submitted two letters in 1997 and 2002.  The legal advice given by the ODOJ (1997) stated: “The Commission’s and Department’s overriding obligation is to manage to prevent serious depletion of any indigenous species, which thereby enables the Department and Commission to provide optimum recreational and aesthetic benefits.”   This was confirmed in 2002 when the ODOJ told the Department: “The proposed language for the new Native Fish Conservation Policy would establish the conservation of naturally produced native fish species as the Department’s “principal obligation” and first priority for fish management.”

We ask the Commission not adopt a permanent rule to allow fishing in Fifteenmile Creek Sanctuary and to rescind the temporary rule adopted in 2012 to permit this fishery.  We make this request because the proposed permanent rule is not consistent with the Commission’s adopted Native Fish Conservation Policy, legal advice by the Oregon Department of Justice; it does not support recovery or protection of ESA-listed fish threatened with extinction, and it is not supportive of the commitments the public and landowners in the Fifteenmile watershed have made to recover the wild steelhead population. 

Salmon Spawner Requirement Needed to Control Harvest

BEYOND HARVEST ALLOCATION

October 10,2012

Wild Salmon Escapement Allocation:

There are major unresolved issues associated with the effort to re-allocate harvest share and management on the Columbia River. Since most wild salmon and steelhead in the lower Columbia River are threatened with extinction and protected by the Endangered Species Act, the health of all wild populations of salmon and steelhead and recovery of threatened populations should be included in any harvest management changes.  The effect of harvest, especially non-selective harvest that takes wild salmonids, is to subtract spawners from their natal watersheds and this can have negative demographic and ecological consequences.  All harvest has an impact, even harvest that targets hatchery fish, for there is always an associated kill of wild salmonids that are caught and released.  The only way to effectively manage harvest to protect and recover wild salmon and steelhead in the lower Columbia River is to regulate harvest to set tributary and specific escapement targets, and then regulate harvest to meet those targets.  There must be sufficient monitoring to ensure the escapement targets are met.

Knudsen (2000) confirms the importance of having conservation escapement requirement: “Both productivity and biodiversity depend on sufficient escapement of spawners to fully utilize the available freshwater habitat, fertilize the systems with carcasses, and optimize genetic diversity.” 

Even though there are currently interim spawner goals recommended (HSRG 2000; NMFS 2002) they have not been adopted as formal requirements.  The important question is this: Does harvest support recovery of ESA-listed salmon and steelhead and protect all wild populations utilizing the lower Columbia River for reproduction?  That is a key question to ask of any harvest allocation plan.

There are other issues that must also be addressed along with a spawner allocation.  They include releasing hatchery fish in the spawning areas used by wild salmon and steelhead; stray hatchery fish that breed with wild salmonids and compete with them for available habitat and food resources in the tributaries, the main stem Columbia and in the estuary, and the impact of stray hatchery fish on streams near hatchery release sites in the lower Columbia River.  Each of these issues can seriously compromise the effectiveness of recovery actions for wild salmonids in lower Columbia River tributaries. 

It is important to not only resolve allocation of fish among user groups, but in doing so, to make sure that wild salmon and steelhead recovery is a benefit of any harvest allocation agreement. 

Harvest reallocation problems have been around for over 100 years.  It is not something new. The history of harvest reallocation in Oregon and Washington indicates that the expected benefits from salmon and steelhead spawner escapement have not been accomplished.  Beginning in the 1930s through the 1950s there were several citizen initiative petitions aimed at protecting salmon from excessive harvest.  The states of Oregon and Washington, in response to citizen promoted measures, eliminated fixed harvest gear like traps and fishwheels.  In 1948 the Fish Commission of Oregon evaluated this change to determine whether what they called the “dire” depletion of salmon in the Columbia River had been addressed by increasing salmon spawner numbers.  Their conclusion was that the fisheries that continued to operate legally in the river simply consumed more fish and the spawning escapement did not increase (Johnson et al 1948). 

Commercial netting in Oregon bays was brought to an end by citizen action in order to rebuild depleted salmon and steelhead populations (Cleaver 1951). What happened is that some species (coho salmon) continued to be over harvested in other fisheries.  These two examples have one thing in common; that is, the state fish management agencies did not establish a spawner requirement and the fisheries could not be adequately controlled.

Harvest management involves two primary activities: setting the allowable harvest and allocating the allowable harvest among the different sport and commercial fisheries. The former is a technical task, the latter is a political task. Too often the technical and the political tasks are so intertwined that their separate roles become confused.  To avoid that confusion the two activities should be clearly separated

(separate oversight and supervision paths) within the organization structure of the management agencies (Lichatowich and Bakke 2012).

The questions in this harvest allocation agreement are whether the agreement includes a spawner escapement requirement sufficient to aid in recovery and reduce the impact of hatchery fish on the spawning grounds. If the answer to either of those questions is “no”, then the allocation agreement will be insufficient to meet Governor Kitzhaber’s dual goals of increasing the economic benefits of the fisheries while aiding in the restoration of threatened and endangered wild fish populations.

Reducing Impact of Hatchery Salmon:

Governor Kitzhaber has expressed concern about the number of hatchery fish in rivers.  Naturally spawning hatchery fish can and do interbreed with wild salmon in rivers reducing the reproductive success of wild salmon (Araki et al 2009; Christie et al. 2011; Chilcote et al. 2010), most of which are threatened with extinction.  In addition, naturally spawning hatchery fish produce juveniles that compete with wild salmon for habitat and food, limit nutrient enrichment of streams from salmon carcasses, and reduce the productive capacity of rivers (Kostow et al. 2006).  

In order to control the impact of naturally spawning hatchery fish in Columbia River tributaries two actions are needed: 1) remove production releases from the tributaries and move them to off-channel net pens in the Columbia River; 2) control stray hatchery fish entering tributaries to help reduce spawning with wild salmonids and creating competition for habitat and food.  These two actions will assist in recovery of ESA-listed salmonids in the tributaries.  The species that are now released into the tributaries and causing problems are hatchery winter and summer steelhead, coho salmon and spring chinook.  By moving production releases of coho and spring chinook to off-channel net pens and applying measures to control strays in streams near those net pens, wild coho and spring chinook in the tributaries could benefit.  It is important to avoid transferring the upstream impacts to downstream locations. Monitoring and evaluation is necessary to prove exactly what benefits are achieved in the tributaries. 

In addition, releases of hatchery salmon at net pens or in tributaries have an impact on wild salmon and steelhead in the mainstem Columbia, the estuary and near-shore ocean waters.  These impacts include competition for food and habitat, predation and predator attraction.  These issues will not be resolved by moving production hatchery fish to net pens. 

Impacts of hatchery steelhead on wild steelhead in tributaries will have to be addressed at the tributary level, for these fish are not a target species for the commercial fishery and should not be moved to off-channel net pens.  However, converting the fishery to selective gear for hatchery fish and live release of wild fish would contribute to improved spawner escapement in the tributaries and increase nutrient enrichment. 

Recommended Hatchery Salmon to be Relocated:

Sandy River spring chinook and coho salmon

Molalla River spring chinook salmon

North Santiam spring chinook

Clackamas River spring chinook and coho salmon

Bill Bakke, Conservation Science Director, Native Fish Society

References

Araki, Hitoshi, Becky Cooper, and Michael S. Blouin. 2009. Carry-over effects of captive breeding reduces reproductive fitness of wild-born descendants in the wild.  Biological Letters 5: (5) 621-624.

Chilcote, Mark M.W., K.W. Goodson, and M.R. Falcy. 2010. Reduced recruitment performance in natural populations of anadromous salmonids associated with hatchery-reared fish. Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 68: 511-522.

Christie, Mark R., Melanie L. Marine, Rod A. French, and Michael S. Blouin. 2011. Genetic adaptation to captivity can occur in a single generation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of North America (PNAS)

Cleaver, F.C. 1951. Fisheries statistics of Oregon. Oregon Fish Commission. Contribution No. 16.

Hatchery Science Review Group (HSRG). 2000. Findings of the Columbia River System-wide Report. HSRG Report Appendix E. 

Johnson, D.R., W.M. Chapman, and R.W. Schoning. 1948. The effects on salmon populations of the partial elimination of fixed fishing gear on the Columbia River in 1935. Fish Commission of Oregon.

Knudsen, et al. 2000. Sustainable fisheries management: Pacific salmon. Eds. E. Erich Knudsen, Cleveland R. Steward, Donald D. McDonald, Jack E. Williams, and Dudley W. Reiser.  Lewis Publishers. Ann Arbor Press.

Kostow, Kathryn E. and Shijie Zhou. 2006. The effect of an introduced summer steelhead hatchery  stock on the productivity of a wild winter steelhead population. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 135:825-841.

Lichatowich and Bakke. 2012. The way forward to protect and recovery wild fish. The Osprey. Issue No. 73.

National Marine Fisheries Service. April 4, 2002. Interim abundance targets for interior Columbia Basin salmon and steelhead listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Bob Lohn letter to Frank L. Cassidy, Jr, Chairman, Northwest Power Planning Council.

Washington State Wild Steelhead Status

Washington State Steelhead Status

Washington Steelhead Management Plan

“In 2004, the Director of the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife challenged the agency to develop a scientific foundation for a Statewide Steelhead Management Plan (SSMP). The scientific foundation for the SSMP comes from the Department’s steelhead science paper “Oncorhynchus mykiss: Assessment of Washington State’s Anadromous Populations and Programs” (Draft February 2, 2008), which provided several findings and recommendations to rebuild Washington’s wild stocks. The findings and recommendations represent the underpinnings of the Statewide Steelhead Management Plan.

“The steelhead management plan is necessary because in spite of seventy years of conservation efforts directed at the state’s steelhead stocks, many of these stocks are at a fraction of their historic numbers. Five of the seven distinct population segments that exist in Washington are currently federally listed under the Endangered Species Act.”

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Scott, James, B. and William T. Gill. 2008. Oncorhynchus mykiss: Assessment of Washington State’s Steelhead Populations and Programs Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. Olympia, Washington

Abundance and Productivity

Abundance and productivity are two of the four VSP characteristics that determine the health of natural populations and opportunities for sustainable fishing opportunities.  Productive, accessible habitat is essential for the long-term viability and productivity of steelhead populations.

Findings and Recommendations:

•  The status of steelhead populations varies substantially across Washington.  Over 90% of the populations in the Olympic Peninsula region and over 60% in the Southwest Washington region were rated as “Healthy”.  However, less than 20% of the steelhead populations were rated as “Healthy” in the five remaining regions of Washington.  Yet, recent data does suggest some reason for optimism.  Possibly due to improved marine conditions, the average escapement for steelhead populations throughout Washington increased by 48% in the years 1999 through 2006 relative to the prior 5 years.  (Chapter 8)

•  Population viability analysis identified thirteen populations of steelhead with the potential for substantive conservation concerns.  The population viability analysis (PVA) conducted for this paper can be used as a tool to filter data and identify populations with a potential conservation concern.  However, additional information is needed to fully assess the risk of extirpation.  PVA can be misleading, particularly  where population structure is uncertain or, as in the case with this analysis, the potential contribution of rainbow trout to population performance was not considered.  (Chapter 8)

Recommendation.  Conduct Status Assessments.  Reassess the status of all populations in Washington on a 4 to 8 year cycle to assure that opportunities for early action are not missed.  Use population viability analysis (PVA) to filter spawner abundance data and, for populations identified to have a potential conservation concern, broaden the analysis to evaluate the contribution of rainbow trout to population viability, the previous performance of the population, and factors affecting population status.  (Chapter 8)

Recommendation.  Formalize Assessment of At-Risk Populations.  Annually  monitor and review the status of populations at risk, identify limiting factors, and assess the effectiveness of management actions.  Recommend and implement new programs to address limiting factors, and potentially initiate

“rescue programs” like kelt reconditioning, natural stream channel rearing, or hatchery supplementation to conserve natural populations until limiting factors are addressed.  (Chapter 8)

•  The inability to monitor the escapement of populations introduces significant uncertainty and risk into the management of steelhead in Washington.  The status of 47% of the steelhead populations could not be rated because of the lack of a time series of escapement or other abundance data.  (Chapter 8)

Recommendation.  Improve Escapement Monitoring.  Prioritize monitoring, solicit funding, develop alternative estimation methods and sample designs, and enlist the assistance of other organizations to increase the percentage of populations assessed on a regular basis.  (Chapter 8)

Historic Abundance    Current Abundance    Average Decline

Grays Harbor (8 Rivers)

5,424                       17,993                  68%

Columbia River Mouth (6 Rivers)

13,706                       2,326                 56%

Southwest Washington (14 Rivers)    62%

Lower Columbia River Winter Steelhead (13 Rivers)

26,228                        5,218                73%

Lower Columbia Summer Steelhead (4 Rivers)

5,016                          2,412                 53%

LCR Winter and Summer (17 Rivers)  69%

Mid-Columbia Steelhead (6 Rivers)

100,409                      4,075                   87%

Upper Columbia Steelhead (4 Rivers)

18,838                           553                   98%   

Snake River Steelhead (4 Rivers)

 28,713                        1,910                    84%

Puget Sound

No data

Olympic Peninsula

No data

Bill McMillan’s assessment of these tables

            The “pre-settlement” steelhead numbers indicated in the 2008 WDFW estimates are clear indications of lack of research into available fishery history with a resulting example of what has been termed the shifting baseline syndrome.    As an example, in 1895 the Grays Harbor weight of steelhead canned was 395,479 pounds which at 8 pounds per winter steelhead (in the ballpark of what the average steelhead was at that time as indicated in the earliest literature) would represent 49,435 steelhead harvested alone.  If harvest was 50% of run-size it would mean a run-size of 100,000 steelhead to the Grays Harbor system of streams.  If harvest was 70% of run-size it would be 70,621 steelhead.  This does not take into account the thousands of steelhead that were used for subsistence, fertilizer, and to feed livestock by the settlers of the region which in Puget Sound was estimated in an 1895 U.S. Fish Commission report to be equal to all the commercial steelhead catch that year on the Stillaguamish River.  This was further confirmed as likely the case from other historic sources.  It also does not include the tribal subsistence fisheries at that time.  From the historic catch data of 1895 the probable realistic range of numbers of steelhead returning to the Grays Harbor system would have been 140,000-200,000 steelhead.

            The WDFW pre-settlement estimated run-size for the Grays Harbor systems is 17,993 steelhead, or 36% of what the reported commercial catch alone was in 1895.  WDFW indicates that the present wild steelhead run-size of the Grays Harbor systems is 5,424 steelhead and represents 68% loss of that at the pre-settlement period.  In fact, that estimate of 5,424 steelhead is 2.7-3.9% of what the wild steelhead run-size range more likely was at the time of 1895 at Grays Harbor, or 96.1-97.3% loss of former wild steelhead numbers.  This is consistent with the steelhead losses found by Gayeski et al. 2011 for the Nooksack, Skagit, Stillaguamish, Snohomish, and remainder of Puget Sound streams that have occurred since 1895. 

            As another example, in the winter of 1953-54 the Queets River of the Olympic Peninsula had a reported tribal catch alone of 13,182 wild winter-run steelhead.  In 1923 a cannery was in operation on the Queets River with 72,000 pounds of canned steelhead packed that would have represented 240,000 pounds of live steelhead if there was 70% wastage as can potentially occur.  Queets steelhead were found to average 9.8 pounds in the tribal catch of the 1930s and 1940s, somewhat larger average than typical for Puget Sound.  The 1923 cannery pack would have represented 24,490 wild steelhead.  If the cannery pack was 50% of the run-size some 48,980 steelhead returned to the Queets that year.  This does not include tribal subsistence catch or that of settlers in the area and is therefore very conservative.

            Wind River in the USFWS surveys of the Columbia River basin during the 1930s was estimated to have sufficient available gravel for about 15,000 spawning salmon based on the size of the average Chinook salmon redd (larger than that for steelhead).  At that time the only fish that had access to the majority of Wind River basin that is above Shepard Falls was summer-run steelhead.  That estimate of Wind River productivity based on available spawning gravel did not include Trout Creek basin now known to be one of the major producers of steelhead.  Therefore the 1930s estimate was conservative.  In 1951 it was estimated that Wind River had an escapement of 2,500 wild summer-run steelhead after a sport harvest of 7,500 pounds, or about 1,000 steelhead for a total of 3,500.  By 1951 Wind River was already in great steelhead decline, and the 1951 return had yet to benefit significantly from removal of the Carson Lumber Company mill dam near today’s Cannavina Road that had denied upstream passage since at least the 1930s to the majority of the best mainstem Wind River spawning habitat.  How WDFW came up with a pre-settlement run-size figure of 2,404 wild summer-run steelhead to Wind River is difficult to determine. 

            Regarding the Eastside streams the estimates are not as far off as for the Westside.  Nevertheless, they have commonly been low-balled.  As one example, Idaho’s Clearwater River as late as 1960 had an escapement of 45,000 wild summer-run steelhead past Lewiston Dam.  This was after the impacts of the commercial fishery in the lower Columbia, Columbia River sport fisheries, and the Snake River sport fishery.  It was long ago noticed in 1895 and 1896 U.S. Fish Commission reports that salmon and steelhead returns to the Columbia and Snake basins had collapsed since 1883 and that the last large returns were in 1878.  1960 was long after these known collapses.   Based on the 1960 steelhead numbers that remained, 19^th century Clearwater run-sizes of wild steelhead in the 200,000 range are realistic.  The Clearwater basin provides a low end measure of what the Yakima basin may have once provided.  Nevertheless, estimates based more on available spawning gravel as one relatively easy habitat measure of productivity may in the future provide estimates of more scientific justification – both historically and at present. 

            These are just a few examples of how WDFW and other Northwest fishery managers have low-balled wild steelhead and salmon productivity prior to habitat alterations and subsequent hatchery impacts.  This is precisely what Daniel Pauly came to term the “shifting baseline syndrome” in 1995 as a worldwide fishery phenomenon that denies the ability to prevent a continuous decline in both salt and fresh water fish populations and similarly prevents recovery as we progressively downgrade fish productivity by using faulty historic baselines.

Rebuilding Oregon Coastal Coho Salmon

Oregon Coastal Coho Recovery Is Beginning

To begin the rebuilding of wild coho salmon, a threatened species, the harvest rate has been reduced by 87% and hatchery coho salmon releases are reduced by 95%. The resulting rebuilding is approaching the abundance of wild spawning adult coho salmon that were in coastal rivers in the 1950s.  However, in the 1950s wild coho abundance was already depleted by harvest, hatchery and habitat abuse over the preceding 100 years or more.  Consequently, the status of wild coho in Oregon coastal streams is a fraction of their historic abundance, and using the abundance of wild coho in the 1950s as the goal for rebuilding and recovery would be relying on a shifting baseline in order to describe success. 

Managing For Failure Over The Last 135 Years

Quantifying Pacific Salmon Extinctions and Loss of Diversity

In 1991 Nehlsen et al. completed an analysis of Pacific salmon and steelhead losses in the western United States and its publication started a firestorm of controversy because for the first time the failure of fish management was made evident to the citizens in the states of California, Idaho, Oregon and Washington. 

A recent assessment by the National Marine Fisheries Service Northwest Science Center (Gustafson et al. 2007) builds on the Nehlsen et al. work by providing an estimate of extinction and loss of diversity in Pacific salmon.   They point out that salmonids that have a stream maturing life history are “much more vulnerable to anthropogenic (human caused) threats” and compiled a separate extinction data for the two types of salmonids (stream maturing and ocean maturing species).  The salmonids that exhibit the stream type life history are spring chinook, coho and summer steelhead.

According to the authors before Euro-American contact there were nearly 1,400 Pacific salmon populations historically occurring in the study area from southern California to the Canadian border including the upper Columbia River in British Columbia. Based on their study, they listed the number of species that remain and those that have gone extinct. Below I present the total numbers, leaving out the ecological regions that define this list of extinct and extant populations, but show the extant populations and (extinct) populations.

Steelhead            436 (131), extinct 23%

Chinook              237 (159), extinct 40%

Sockeye               38   (34), extinct 47%

Coho                  135   (50), extinct 27%

Chum                   89    (23), extinct 21 %

Pink                     42    (  9), extinct 18 %

Total                     977 (406), extinct 29%

“Nearly 1,400 Pacific salmon populations historically occurred in the study area, and an estimated 29% have gone extinct since substantial Euro-American contact.” The authors say that overall, the six species no longer occur in about one-third of the 6 ecological regions they once occupied in this study.

“The estimated proportion of extinct historical populations was relatively low in coastal drainages from Vancouver Island to northern California  (20%), but increased dramatically in southern California (31%), the California Central Valley (57%), and the interior Columbia River Basin (35-62% in areas still accessible to Pacific salmon).  All historical anadromous populations were extirpated from the Upper Snake River and Columbia River headwaters regions following installation of impassable dams.”

“Extinctions were also non-random with respect to species and major maturation types.  Coho salmon once occupied a range almost as large as that of chinook salmon and steelhead, which historically occupied all ecological regions, but native coho salmon populations have disappeared from large portions of California and the Columbia River Basin.  Coho salmon may be particularly at risk due to their lengthy (greater than one year) juvenile freshwater residence where they are exposed to freshwater habitat alterations) and a nearly fixed three-year life cycle (providing less of a buffer against year-class failure than most other salmon species).”

“Stream-maturing steelhead (summer steelhead) had significantly more proportional population losses than ocean-maturing steelhead (winter steelhead), and stream-maturing chinook salmon (spring and summer chinook) had a significantly higher proportion of population losses than ocean-maturing chinook (fall and winter chinook).  High losses of stream-maturing populations are likely due to widespread loss of crucial high elevation (generally 500 m) holding habitats and to their vulnerability during prespawning holding period.”

“The loss of major genetic groups (27%) was nearly as high as extirpation from ecological regions (33%), but the loss of major life history types was less extensive (an estimated 15%) and perhaps confined to two species (chum and coho salmon).”

“Estimated number of stream and ocean maturing steelhead and chinook salmon populations that are extinct in the study area.

Steelhead (stream maturing)        Total Extinctions in Study Area:    54 populations, 31% of populations.

Steelhead (ocean maturing)          Total Extinctions in Study Area:    77 populations, 19% of populations

Chinook (stream maturing)           Total Extinctions in Study Area:    124 populations, 19% of populations

Chinook (ocean maturing)             Total Extinctions in Study Area:    35 populations, 21% of populations.

Extinction of Ecological (33 populations), life history (15 populations), and genetic diversity (27 populations) of Pacific salmonids was also estimated.”

The authors say, “Our analysis indicated that Pacific salmon in this region retain substantial evolvability as demonstrated by the persistence of over two-thirds of historical populations…it is apparent that to preserve biodiversity at multiple scales in wild Pacific salmon, both the local population and its habitat (freshwater and marine) must become the basic unit of conservation.”

“Because over one-third of the remaining populations belong to threatened or endangered species listed under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, it is apparent that a critical juncture has been reached in efforts to preserve what remains of Pacific salmon diversity.”

The historical decline in wild salmonids, with 29% of these populations now extinct and losses in the diversity of existing populations over the last 135 years of salmon management constitutes a failure of management by any measure.

Gustafuson, Robin Waples, Rick, Jim Myers, Laurie Weitkamp, G.J. Bryant, Orlay Johnson, and Jeff Hard. 2007. Pacific salmon extinctions: quantifying lost and remaining diversity. Conservation Biology (4): 1009-1020.

NATIVE FISH SOCIETY IS THE WAY FORWARD FOR NATIVE WILD SALMONIDS

The Native Fish Society has an important mission that others believe in and support. We are making progress.  I have worked in native fish conservation for more than 40 years and have spent time with legislators in my constant effort to strengthen and fund conservation.  Senator Jan Wyers responded in the 1980s by funding five native fish conservation positions at ODFW.  It was though that program that key people were hired and important work for Oregon’s wild salmonids was accomplished.  In 2012 the legislature is again concerned about the future of wild salmonids as more and more populations are  protected under the ESA and others are lost forever.  The NFS Hatchery Accountability Project clearly states that there needs to be better accountability for biological and cost impacts of hatchery programs. There have been two hearings this session and in the next session our goal is to hold the agency accountable. 

At one time it was possible to expect administrative solutions to problems affecting native fish management by government agencies, but that has changed, so legal action is necessary to force the government  to follow its own rules and comply with state and federal law.  This is why we have put ODFW on notice to clean-up its Sandy Hatchery program so that wild winter steelhead, coho, fall chinook and spring chinook are protected and a path is opened up for their recovery under the ESA.   A 76% stray rate of hatchery spring chinook into the wild chinook spawning grounds is not acceptable under state or federal rules and it needs to be corrected. 

We are in Stevenson Washington tonight defending the management program for recovery of wild summer steelhead in Wind River.  This run has been protected as a wild steelhead management river since 1982, but there is local pressure for a stock and kill fishery.  We are involved in these public meetings to make sure that the Wind River wild summer steelhead continue to rebuild and eventually recover.

The NFS is working for wild salmon, steelhead and trout throughout the Northwest through direct action and by supporting the good work of other groups.  Our volunteer river stewards are working in their communities for healthy watersheds and native fish.  It is a big job and for a small organization and it can seem wild and wooly, but we are undaunted in our efforts and we have a record of success when we take time to look in the rear-view mirror. 

I am committed to the future of the Native Fish Society because it is an effective advocate for native wild fish in the Northwest.  We base our advocacy on the best available science and there is a lot of it being published that has direct bearing on our conservation work.  We have a history of success but we could do better with more funding and more folks to push our advocacy program forward.  The point is that as we grow our funding base we do so without sacrificing our mission for native wild fish.   The organization and its leadership have made that commitment and with the support of our members and friends we can be successful in solving complex and difficult problems for wild native fish in the region. 

Making Hatcheries More Accountable

Summary Comment

By Bill Bakke

For the Senate Environment and Natural Resource Committee

Oregon Legislature

January 18, 2012

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The accumulated evidence from both scientific and economic analysis over the last 130 years shows that salmon and steelhead are declining and that management investments have failed to mitigate for the loss and have been unable to recover the diversity, productivity, and abundance of wild salmonids in Oregon and the Northwest ecosystems that support them.  This evidence suggests that our response and our investments to curb this decline are not working.  They are not working because we are more concerned about hatchery production than with restoring the productivity and resilience of salmonid populations adapted to individual watersheds. 

The solution appears to be deceptively simple, but it isn’t because the institutions we fund with public money and rely upon to solve complex problems of salmon and steelhead recovery and watershed productivity have not been held accountable for their performance. 

The Legislature can help solve this problem by directing the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife to enlist the aid of the Department of Administrative Services to contract for a risk and benefit assessment of the fish propagation program by an independent outside source with the necessary expertise to do the work.  Funding for this assessment is currently available in surpluses to ODFW’s Commercial Fish Fund and Other Fund accounts.  It is appropriate that fishing interests, who are the direct beneficiaries of the hatchery program, be the ones to pay for the cost of assessing the benefits and risks of the hatchery program.

The Legislature should also add a performance measure for the agency that would establish a process to assure the Legislature that ODFW is complying with the recommendations that come out of this assessment of the hatchery program.

These actions are needed because the evidence points out these facts:

1. Salmon and steelhead are 3 to 5 percent of their historic abundance
2. Many populations are threatened with extinction and under federal protection
3. Hatchery fish survival is only about 10% of that for wild salmonids with a range of 6-45 percent
4. Hatchery fish contribute to the decline of wild salmonids
5. Many if not most hatchery programs are deficit spending programs
6. Hatchery productivity and cost effectiveness rely on having access to wild stocks
7. As hatchery costs increase and benefits decline funding will become a more critical problem
8. Continuing the conflict between hatchery performance and cost with wild salmonid productivity and recovery will continue to have a substantial impact on Oregon’s fishing economy  

HATCHERY SALMON AND STEELHEAD WASTE HABITAT

HATCHERY FISH WASTE HABITAT

“In the Clackamas River basin, the summer steelhead hatchery adults had poor reproductive success; fewer smolts were produced per parent than in the wild population, and almost no offspring of hatchery fish survived to adulthood (Kostow et al. 2003). The hatchery program was meant to provide a sport fishery, and the production of adult offspring was not intended. If successful hatchery reproduction had occurred, at least the offspring could have contributed to fisheries. Instead, the hatchery fish wasted basin capacity by occupying habitat and depressing wild production while producing nothing useful themselves. It is not unusual for hatchery adults to have poor reproductive success when they spawn naturally (other examples are provided by Reisenbichler and Rubin 1999, Kostow 2004, and McLean et al. 2004). The combined effect of poor hatchery fish fitness and depressed wild fish production due to competition with the hatchery fish poses a double jeopardy that could quickly erode natural production in any system.” 

Kostow & Zhou (2006) page 839:

Not only do hatchery fish waste habitat, making it less productive than it would be with wild salmon and steelhead spawners, the investments made in habitat restoration are also wasted when the habitat is over-run with naturally spawning hatchery fish.  When the benefits of habitat restoration are calculated the impact of hatchery fish on those benefits is never included. Habitat restoration is based on the dual premise that it improves the productivity of wild salmonids and that it is cost effective. It is also assumed that habitat is limiting in all cases and that to increase the production of wild salmonids habitat investment is necessary.  Because habitat restoration is typically not done within the context of fishery management by government agencies such factors as harvest and hatchery impacts are not addressed and the limitations these actions impose on the success of habitat investment is not acknowledged, evaluated and monitored.  

It is important that habitat restoration serves the fish, improves watershed productivity and benefits other wildlife and not become an official deception.  Habitat restoration should not be used by agencies to escape their accountability to protect wild salmonids and the healthy watersheds they require to be self-sustaining.

Hatchery Impacts on Wild Salmon and Steelhead

The following summary is my attempt to provide each of my readers with a well documented list of impacts that hatcheries impose on wild salmonids.  This information will allow you to understand the hatchery reform needed to reduce impacts on wild salmonids.  In the Northwest fish management has embraced the hatchery option for over 130 years as a way to "mitigate" for watershed development at the expense of wild salmon and steelhead.  This approach has promoted the degradation of watersheds and is forcing the replacement of wild native stocks with artificially propagated fish that have reduced reproductive success and interfere with the health and productivity of wild salmonids.  What is missing in the Northwest is a wild native salmonid conservation program that effectively protects wild salmonid productivity, identity, and abundance.

The listing of wild stocks under the federal ESA has resulted in little benefit to wild salmon and steelhead populations but it has justified $1 Billion in annual funding for salmon recovery.  The ESA has expanded the hatchery solution to wild salmon decline and the fish management agencies have been the primary beneficiaries of this annual flow of public tax dollars into the region.

It should be kept in mind that the primary goal of fish management agencies is not recovery of wild salmonids but to maintain an endless process of planning and the funding it provides.  The goal is process not conservation and recovery.  The only way that this perversion of the ESA will come to an end is when the wild salmon go extinct or are recovered.  Another way, of course, is causing the agencies to be accountable for their programs, actions and expenditures.  That requires oversight by government.  It takes an independent review to make the agency bosses uncomfortable.

The brief summary on the impacts of hatchery production below is focused on how hatcheries affect the viability of wild salmonids.  It needs to be expanded to include harvest reform measures, but it does capture the need to have minimum spawner abundance objectives that would be delivered by species for each watershed as purpose of harvest management.  These science based recommendations are sound and they can be done, but the fish managers are not comfortable applying science to their management, so progress will be resisted and defeated without a strong push by those interested in wild salmon and steelhead recovery.

HATCHERY SALMONID IMPACTS ON WILD SALMONIDS

By Bill Bakke

• Naturally spawning hatchery fish from long term hatchery cultivation produce 6-11% to the adult stage compared to wild fish. ( Leider et al. 1989, Araki et al 2006)

• In the first generation native broodstock hatchery fish (using wild steelhead for hatchery broodstock) the reproductive success of the hatchery fish spawning naturally in streams declines by 14% (males) and 2% (females) compared to wild fish spawning naturally in the river. (ISRP 2011)

• In later generations (second and third) the reproductive success of native broodstock hatchery steelhead spawning naturally in streams is 50% (males) lower and 77% (females) lower than naturally spawning wild fish. (ISRP 2011) 

• There is a genetic change in the hatchery steelhead that carries over to naturally produced progeny of hatchery-origin parents causing reduced reproductive fitness of wild-born descendants in the wild and the population fitness of subsequent generations. (Araki et al. 2009, ISRP 2011)

• In just 6 generations native broodstock hatchery steelhead reproductive success is 29% to 54% that of wild steelhead. (Berntson 2011)

• In order to maintain cost effective hatchery programs, access to healthy abundant wild steelhead populations is required. (Based on research by Araki et al. 2008)

• In order to protect and rebuild wild salmon and steelhead populations harvest targeted on hatchery fish must be regulated to protect wild spawner abundance, spawner abundance goals need to be adopted by species and watershed, hatchery transfers among watershed need to be eliminated, and naturally spawning hatchery fish need to be excluded from wild fish spawning areas. (Conclusions base on best available science)

• Impacts of hatchery fish on wild fish must be controlled so that competition for food and space for rearing juveniles in streams and the estuary support wild fish survival, predation and predator attraction by hatchery fish is controlled to protect survival of wild fish, and nutrient enrichment targets from natural spawning wild fish support and expand the productive capacity of the habitat. (Conclusion based on best available science)

• Competition between wild and hatchery fish spawning naturally in a common habitat can reduce the production of wild juveniles by 50% (Kostow  2004)

• The cost to produce a hatchery steelhead that contributes to the catch is $200 to over $400 per fish harvested.   Most hatchery programs funded with tax dollars are not cost effective, making the hatchery program vulnerable to loss of funding as hatcheries compete for funding with other social needs for available dollars. .  (Hans Radtke 2011, IEAB 2000)

HOW AGENCIES DEFEAT PUBLIC INITIATIVES

INSTITUTIONAL SELECTION

We have all heard of natural selection, a concept created by Charles Darwin in 1859. It is the primary way in which animals and plants adapt to their environments through sexual reproduction.

There is another form of selection having to do with cultural forces, a system of beliefs, assumptions, and values. Institutional selection imposes compliance among people in agencies and business. If one wants to rise within the institution a clear record of compliance to institutional values and beliefs is required. These selective factors are often unspoken, but those who want the institutional rewards are nonetheless very much aware of them.

Public agencies are influenced by having to be responsive to public concerns and involve the public in policy development. The problem for the agency is that the public can interfere with agency culture. They are constantly having to deal with public proposals and are obligated to hold public hearings on issues that can result in agency change. For this reason public agencies have developed a sophisticated resistance to outside interference. As one administrator once told me if you poke us too much in one direction, we build a callus.

The first level of resistance comes when the agency is confronted with a policy change over how it administers its system of assumptions, beliefs and values. The public initiatives arrive without invitation from outside the agency. As one director of the Oregon fish and wildlife department once said, “we can recover salmon if the public would just stay out of our business.” This candid burp was rather revealing for its honesty.

Public agencies are also burdened with a commission that can, when they feel forced, be responsive to public initiatives to change agency policy. The commission is always a wild card that the agency staff is constantly worried about, for it could mean a reflexive change in the why things are done, so they spend a lot of time tuning the commission up to support staff’s natural abhorrence to any change whatsoever. But change happens and the agency has developed a way to slow change down and defeat it, if given enough time.

The first thing that staff does with cooperation of its legal department is make sure that any policy change has no clauses of accountability embedded in it, something the public can use to pester the agency about non-compliance through the courts. So all policy changes are cleansed of deadlines, deliverables, numerical values or anything else that the public can use to threatened the status quo of agency operations.

Another useful tactic is to know your public. This is necessary because the agency is often called upon to assemble a public advisory group to help in the process of policy development. A useful precautionary tactic is to stack public advisory groups with people who are supportive of the agency status quo, but to appear non-partial they appoint one or at the most two people who are progressive in their views knowing they can be controlled or out voted. A novel refinement of this tactic is to invite people who are opposed to the agency altogether. They are useful in creating conflict with the feared change makers giving the agency the middle ground. For example, when deciding the Native Fish Conservation Policy, the ODFW invited the private property advocates to the table. These folks were opposed to fish protection because they believed private use of land was threatened. Including them on a committee to develop conservation plans for the protection of native species insured conflict. This was an unusually perceptive adjustment by staff to protect the agency status quo for it created a strong opposition to those seeking a strong conservation policy and at the same time gave the agency staff the middle ground. The staff ran shuttle diplomacy between the two opposing groups in the committee, telling each one what they wanted to hear, thus strengthening the conflict. This increased the agency capacity to maintain the status quo.

Another artful dodge is to maintain a policy in draft form for as long as possible so that it is not binding on the agency and no matter how hard the public might press them to implement the policy, the agency reminds them that it is only a draft.

These tactics are for the single purpose of protecting the agency from change, especially those threats generated by the public.

Once a policy development committee is seated, it is obvious to the agency staff that change is inevitable, so additional tactics are necessary to slow change down.

The second level of resistance is to not implement or make implementation impossibly slow so that those wanting change get busy on other things and public pressure is dissipated. Too often the public assumes that once a policy is adopted by the agency and becomes administrative law, that the agency will practice due diligence and implement that policy. The public spends a lot of time in policy development but attention wanes when it comes to carrying out the policy on the ground.

When the Oregon department of fish and wildlife adopted the Oregon Wild Fish Management Policy in 1978 and revised it several times later to remove legal handles that could prove inconvenient, it was discovered that the policy was not actually being applied agency wide. The policy was never popular and it was left up to staff to implement if they wanted to do so. The environmental advocates for this policy assumed that it was being applied across the state to provide protection for wild fish and were shocked to find out that it was an elective.

When the public was successful in convincing the commission to implement a slot regulation for Deschutes River trout fishery, one agency administrator complained that ODFW no longer managed the Deschutes, the public did. The slot regulation did away with bait and allowed a restricted kill of trout in number and size. This lead to a catch and release fishery, which is not favored by an agency that believes a kill fishery is the only way to sell licenses.

The following is provided to show just how strong resistance to institutional change can be. The Oregon Legislature passed a state law that said it is the obligation of the fish and wildlife department and commission to “prevent the serious depletion of indigenous (native) species.” Serious depletion was not defined so the agency had plenty of interpretation room to avoid compliance. The ODFW commission got into the act and said that the law also directed the agency to provide social benefits and concluded that conservation was balanced by the requirement to provide those benefits such as harvested fish. They developed a code for killing fish called “fishing opportunity.”

At the request of the public, the Oregon Attorney General’s office provided the ODFW with its assessment of this statute in 1997 and again in 2003. In those legal reviews the agency was told that its “overriding obligation is to prevent the serious depletion of indigenous species” and the agency is unable to provide social benefits unless this happened. Thus, the balancing argument of the ODFW commission was set aside, but their dedication for it was not.

Also at the public’s request, the ODFW director distributed the 1997 legal opinion from the AG’s to the staff so they would be fully informed about the law and their obligation to it. However, this law did not mesh well with the understood institutional mission of the agency by staff. One did not advance their careers by being an advocate for wild fish. One staff person who left ODFW told me he left because he did not like getting in trouble for following the rules.

In 2003 the AG’s office once again reminded the agency of its overriding obligation to protect native species from serious depletion as they sought to adopt the Native Fish Conservation Policy. In 2010 this state law still has no real traction within the agency in their day to day management. It was disturbing when a commissioner told me that he did not know how to deal with this responsibility.

It can be argued that when the state assigns a species as sensitive, which means it is precarious and vulnerable to extinction, or when a species is provided protection under the federal Endangered Species Act, that it is certainly seriously depleted. With regard to ESA-listed species, the states must get coverage from the National Marine Fisheries Service to run its hatchery and harvest programs. This would appear to be a serious check on any agency’s institutional mission, but it isn’t, for even though the federal agency requires the agency to justify its actions, it is not often different from what the agency would have done anyway. The only difference is the additional paper work.

In the state of Washington, the WDFW commission adopted a Wild Salmonid Policy. The director that led this adoption struggle and the staff person that drafted the policy lost their job soon after this policy was adopted. Since its adoption, the agency has quietly ignored it for it requires change in hatchery and harvest structures that have been in place a long time.

More recently, the WDFW commission adopted a Wild Steelhead Management Plan. This plan calls for Wild Steelhead Management Zones to be adopted. The public requested this and was successful. However, when asked why there has been little movement in setting up Wild Steelhead Management Zones, including the 20 that the public recommended, they are given a number of reasons.

The first artful dodge is that this policy is still in draft form so it is not binding on the agency. That reasoning inflames the public so other reasons had to be found. Since their co-managers, Native American tribes, did not sign this policy, the agency cannot implement it. That is a better excuse because someone else is to blame. When reminded that the WDFW has an obligation to secure 50% of the available harvest for its constituents in a shared resource with the tribes, there is ample room to provide for wild steelhead management zones. When the public advocates are willing to forgo harvest to increase the spawner abundance of steelhead in these WSMZs it is unreasonable to allow the tribes to harvest the forgone and so-called surplus from the recreational fishery. But because the agency does not establish a steelhead harvest management plan prior to the fishery starting, it claims there is no power to make changes to protect spawners and achieve spawner escapement goals in each river that is co-managed. So the agency, by not doing its job creates an excuse to harvest all the fish, including those needed for spawning. In order to do this and still appear to be managers of good faith, the recreational fishery is closed while the tribal fishery continues to fish. The conclusion is that wild steelhead are not getting the needed protection.

In lower Puget Sound hatchery fish harvest zones were created to maximize the harvest of hatchery coho. Wild coho spawner objectives by watershed have not been established because that would interfere with the harvest of hatchery fish. A recent petition to list wild coho in Puget Sound by the public is an attempt to correct this problem. By not protecting wild spawner abundance the WDFW is ignoring the best available science that has been in place for 72 years following the research of Willis Rich.

The conflict over conservation of native wild fish populations is created by the fish management agencies. As one retired ODFW biologist told me, wild fish and their habitat are irrelevant to the agency. They manage by a simple model of stocking hatchery fish and running kill fisheries. If one challenges that, one threatens the institution that is based on an industrial model of production and consumption where wild fish are considered a constraint on commodity production.

Fish and wildlife agencies have developed an elaborate resistance to changing their institutional structure of beliefs, assumptions and values. Even though they are public agencies they have created proven ways to blunt the effect of public reform efforts. They have rationalized state laws when they are in conflict with agency operations. They are able to do this because elected officials such as legislators, Congress, and governors, are not interested in resolving the problem.

The public makes its demands and it can have a modest effect on the institutional culture of fish management, but unless the public is fully engaged constantly, agencies find a way to step around and reduce the effect of the changes. The public cannot assume the fish management agency will follow through on its commitments, tell the truth or follow the law, and for that reason, the public needs to be organized so that it is applying pressure constantly year after year to make sure conservation policies are implemented.

Most public groups are themselves not organized to be vigilant protectors of Nature. For one thing policy development and accountability do not sell as well to foundations as do “shovel ready” short tem action projects that have a short life span. First the environmental groups need to make a commitment to follow through on policy development and implementation and find the donors that will help make that commitment a real force for conservation. The other important thing to do is work to elect public officials that actually care about how the state and the nation is protecting the environment and to have elected officials leverage the public’s concern for protecting nature.

Lacking that commitment the public groups are constantly fighting a rear-guard action plan and responding to crisis issues. This means that the agencies will not be reformed, and in the case of salmon, wild native species will not be recovered and there will be no end of populations being listed as endangered species and the rapid rate of extinction will not be addressed. Public agencies are organized to serve the narrow interests of their constituents rather than maintain the productivity and benefits of natural resources they are charged with protecting for the public good.

Recommended Reading:

Jim Lichatowich, Salmon Without Rivers

Lichatowich and Williams, Failure to incorporated science into fishery management (see the Native Fish Society web page for this article)

Rick Scarce, Fishy Business

WILD STEELHEAD MORTALITY AND GEAR TYPE

In 2001 Bob Hooton, fish biologist for the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, evaluated the impact of bait, lures and flies on steelhead and resident fish. This paper reviews what is known through scientific evaluation of relative impacts of these fishing types.  I have provided a few interesting quotes form this paper below.

“During the Keogh River experiment, it quickly became evident that, in order to obtain the requisite sample size of steelhead hooked on artificial lures, it was necessary to commence angling sessions with that gear type.  Despite a strong bias towards artificial lure fishing prior to using bait, lures caught 99 fish while bait produced 236 or 2.38 times as many for similar hours fished.  Additionally artificial lures caught fish were hooked deep inside the mouth or gill arches and bleeding heavily in 4 of 99 cases (4.04%).  Bait caught fish were similarly hooked in 26 of 236 records (11.02%) or 2.72 times as often.”

“During the Keogh hooking mortality study discussed earlier a total of 130 and 206 

steelhead were angled in study years 1985 and 1986 respectively (Hooton, 1987). The

weir count of adult steelhead over the period that angling occurred downstream from the

fence was used to provide a reasonable approximation of the percentage of the run

captured in the time allocated. In 1985, the data revealed that project staff fished 117

hours to catch 130 steelhead that represented about 27% of the fish available. In 1986,

121 hours were angled to catch 206 fish that represented about 19% of the supply. In

other words two anglers fishing an average of one hour per day over a two month period

caught roughly one quarter of the population one year and one fifth the next. All of that

occurred in about 50 meters (164 feet) of river.”

“More recently Keogh project technicians involved in requisite sampling of steelhead

upstream from an electronic counter captured 45%, 62% and 30% of the total available

supply of steelhead in 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. For 2001 to date the figure

stands at 51% (personal communication, Bruce Ward, Senior Anadromous Biologist,

Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, University of BC, Vancouver). These catch

rates resulted from two staff fishing for an hour or two per day over several kilometers of

a river that is not held to be particularly accessible or “fishable” by most steelhead

anglers. All of the fish were angled with bait.”

“What we can say, however, is that angling with baited hooks is prevalent in streams

where it is legal, that angling with bait generally results in substantially higher catch rates

and mortality rates for both target and non-target fish than angling with any other gear

type, that many of the wild steelhead stocks subjected to this combination of factors are

far below target escapement and that the status of non-target stocks and/or species is

frequently as bad or worse than steelhead.”

“Catch and release may have been oversold in that there tends to be a pervasive opinion it can be prosecuted limitlessly with no influence on the status or health of steelhead or sympatric species. With respect to fluvial resident trout populations it was accepted long ago fish are too catchable and prone to hooking mortality to sustain fishing with certain gear types. Resident fish are simply that – stationary inhabitants of the available habitat. Arguably, steelhead in most of British Columbia’s short coastal streams, are effectively resident trout. Their vulnerability is entirely comparable to fluvial resident trout.”

Rearing juvenile steelhead and resident fish are affected by gear type:

“With respect to fluvial resident trout populations it was accepted long ago fish are too catchable and prone to hooking mortality to sustain fishing with certain gear types. Resident fish are simply that – stationary inhabitants of the available habitat. Arguably, steelhead in most of British Columbia’s short coastal streams, are effectively resident trout. Their vulnerability is entirely comparable to fluvial resident trout.”

““Bruesewitz (1995, WDFW) examined the location of hooking among creeled summer and winter steelhead in different Washington State streams in the 1992, 1993 and 1994 sport fisheries. She found that the single hook and bait combination resulted in a 2.33 times higher incidence of hooking in critical locations (14.9% versus 6.4%) than did single hooks and artificial lures.”

Exposure to air and mortality rate:

“Ferguson and Tufts (1993) reported disturbingly higher mortality among domestic

rainbow trout subjected to air exposure after mimicked angling events than for control

fish or experimental fish not exposed to air. Their data revealed 100% survival among

control fish and 88% survival among exercised (i.e., “angled”) fish. Among fish that were

exercised and then exposed to air for 30 and 60 seconds immediately thereafter,

survival dropped to 62% and 28% respectively. The authors stressed their results had

important implications for Atlantic salmon sport fisheries where the marked trend was

toward catch and release but where anglers habitually hold fish out of water for

significant periods of time prior to release.

Influence of multiple captures on fish mortality:

“The influence of multiple captures of individual steelhead is another element of many

British Columbia steelhead fisheries that remains to be evaluated. Catch and tag

recovery data from a large number and range of Ministry programs indicate that in many

heavily fished streams steelhead are commonly caught two or more times. It is

reasonable to conclude the frequency of these occurrences has increased steadily over

the past two decades. The emerging and unanswered questions are whether or not

there are cumulative effects associated with multiple captures and how significant these

are from a population perspective? It is clear from the available CPUE (and mortality

rate) data presented above, however, that any risk of sub-lethal effects associated with

multiple captures would be skewed markedly toward gear types and procedures that

increased an individual fish’s frequency of exposure to those circumstances.”

Hatchery fish increase angling pressure and wild steelhead mortality

“Close examination of Steelhead Harvest Analysis (SHA) data reveals a consistent pattern on streams where hatchery steelhead have been introduced. The years immediately following first returns of harvestable hatchery fish display pronounced

increases in angling effort and record high estimates of wild steelhead caught and

released (mandatory). Catches tend to have been sustained despite conclusive

evidence of declining abundance in index streams.”

Anglers can choose to protect wild steelhead

“The angling community may wish to contemplate leaving a smaller and softer

footprint on all wild fish or risk the steady erosion of longer term opportunity. A sobering

reality is that the trends in stream fishing opportunity throughout virtually all of

southwestern British Columbia have manifested themselves in a very few generations of

steelhead. Ignoring history and assuming trends will be stabilized or reversed in the

absence of attention to fishing impacts is unlikely to produce a desirable outcome.”

HATCHERY STEELHEAD IMPACT WILD STEELHEAD

In a recent conversation with an executive of the ODFW fish division about releasing hatchery steelhead in the Sandy River, Oregon, the assertion was made that these hatchery fish had no impact on wild steelhead.  That is a statement of fact, so I asked for the supporting data.  After a bit of dithering, he admitted that this conclusion was indeed only an assumption. 

Apparently, biologists that hold important political positions within an agency or those that have an agenda regardless of their pecking order within the agency, feel comfortable making factual statements even though they have no facts to back them up.  Typically, the public has been conditioned to accept a strongly stated assertion at face value.  After all, why would they lie?  The public trust is easily violated by agenda driven agency functionaries. 

Years of scientific studies costing thousands of dollars have shown that the release of hatchery steelhead has an impact on the health, abundance, and status of wild steelhead in our rivers.  The public pays for these studies and should expect that what is learned would be applied to management decsions by government agencies, but there is no obligation for an agency or its personnel to use this information in their work.  

What are some of the facts about releasing hatchery steelhead in streams already occupied by wild steelhead? 

“Hatchery steelhead displaced wild O. mykiss in 79% of the contests observed between these groups. Our results indicate that the behavior of hatchery steelhead can pose risks to preexisting wild O. mykiss where the two interact.”

That is a startling fact discovered in 1999 by McMichael and others doing a study of hatchery and wild steelhead interactions on the Yakima River.  That fact was documented 12 years ago.  I wonder why it the ODFW biologist did not use it to at least question his assumption that releasing hatchery steelhead had no effect on wild steelhead in Oregon?  Maybe he did not know about this study and maybe since it was from a Yakima River study in the state of Washington, it somehow does not apply to Oregon rivers. 

What else did the scientists find out about hatchery steelhead impacts on wild steelhead in the Yakima River?

“Strategies to minimize undesirable risks associated with behavior of released hatchery steelhead should be addressed if protection and restoration of wild steelhead stocks is the management goal.”

That is interesting.  Maybe this ODFW biologist is not interested in the protection and restoration of wild steelhead in the Sandy River?  But I am sure he must be concerned for after all the wild steelhead are threatened with extinction and their recovery is his responsibility. His agency has even underscored that responsibility in the form of policy when in 2003 the ODFW commission adopted a rule that says protection of native fish is the primary goal of the agency.   Even Oregon state law directs the agency to prevent the serious depletion of native species.  That has been confirmed by the Oregon Department of Justice to mean that the department and the commission have an overriding obligation to prevent the depletion of native species.  I would be surprised if this legal direction did not also include agency biologists and executives. 

I was surprised by the comment of an ODFW biologist that had left the agency for another in state government.  When I asked him why he had left ODFW he simply replied: “I wanted to work for an agency where I did not get in trouble for following the rules.”

Reference

McMichael, Geoffrey A.; Todd N. Pearsons; Steven A. Leider. 1999. Behavioral interactions among hatchery-reared steelhead smolts and wild Oncorhynchus mykiss in natural streams. North American Journal of Fisheries Management. Vol. 19, Issue 4. pages 948-956.